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THE BRITISH BILL OF RIGHTS DEBATE: 
LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIA
1
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For several years, the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has been embroiled in a crisis that 
threatens its very existence. The statute is beset by a number of problems. It has been widely 
attacked in parts of the press, is poorly understood by the public and has been slated for 
repeal by the Cameron Conservative government, which proposes to replace it with a British 
Bill of Rights (BBOR). Whatever its successes, all this points to the fact that the HRA has 
failed to attain the same level of acceptance as like instruments in other democratic nations. 
 
In conservative circles, and possibly beyond them, the HRA has given rise to a number of 
deep-seated concerns. The first is that the Act compromises the sovereignty of Parliament by 
conferring undue powers upon the judiciary. Legislation must be read compatibly with the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) ‘[s]o far as it is 
possible to do so’.2 The Conservatives criticise this aspect of the HRA for allowing the courts 
to go ‘to artificial lengths to change the meaning of legislation … even if this is inconsistent 
with Parliament’s intention when enacting the relevant legislation.’3 
 
Second, the HRA is said to provide a means by which domestic laws and policies may be 
unduly directed by the Strasbourg Court.
4
 Domestic courts are directed to ‘take into account’ 
relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence,
5
 but the argument is that they are unduly tied to it. It has 
also been said that Strasbourg has generated ‘mission creep’ as it interprets and reinterprets 
the ECHR in the light of evolving context and ‘expand[s] Convention rights into new areas, 
and certainly beyond what the framers of the Convention had in mind when they signed up to 
it.’ 6  In this regard the Conservatives direct particular criticism at Strasbourg decisions 
                                                     
1
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 HRA, s 3(1). 
3
 Conservatives, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s 
Human Rights Laws’ (2014) 4 (available at 
https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/downloadable%20Files/human_rights.pdf).  
4
 The Supreme Court has recently reasserted the common law’s primacy over the ECHR as a system for 
safeguarding basic rights: e.g. R (Osborn) v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61; Kennedy v Information 
Commissioner [2014] UKSC 20. See also Roger Masterman and Se-shauna Wheatle, ‘A Common Law 
Resurgence in Rights Protection? [2015] EHRLR 57. 
5
 HRA, s 2(1). 
6
 Conservatives (fn 3) 3. The ECHR is said by Strasbourg to be ‘a living instrument which … must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’: Tyrer v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1 [31]. 
concerning the disenfranchisement of prisoners
7
 and the expulsion of foreign criminals and 
suspected terrorists.
8
 
 
Third, it is argued that the HRA has generated outcomes antithetical to British values and the 
policies of British governments. The complaint is that domestic courts have improperly 
engaged in ‘essentially political evaluation of different policy considerations’ through the 
Strasbourg-imported proportionality doctrine,
9
 and that ‘in many areas the interpretation 
given to Convention rights has not struck the appropriate balance between individual rights 
and responsibilities to others’.10 For example, the Conservatives criticise the notion that a 
foreign national convicted of murder should be able to resist deportation by relying on the 
qualified right to respect for private and family life under Art 8 ECHR.
11
 
 
The first two of these concerns have in particular been contested,
12
 and indeed it is debatable 
whether they accurately portray the HRA’s operation and effect. For example, the notion that 
domestic courts pay undue deference to Strasbourg’s interpretation of the ECHR has been 
questioned in a recent analysis emphasising that the courts have been making increasing use 
of the discretion given to them by s 2 HRA to depart from Strasbourg jurisprudence.
13
 
 
Whether or not these concerns can be substantiated, it is evident that they have undermined 
support for the Act on the part of the Conservatives (and also in parts of the Labour party) 
and within the populace generally. This has produced policies on the part of the Conservative 
government that will spell the HRA’s demise if implemented. Hence, the pledge of the 
Conservative party at the 2015 general election was to ‘scrap the Human Rights Act, and 
introduce a British Bill of Rights’.14 It is also the policy of the UK government to ‘break the 
formal link between British courts and the European Court of Human Rights, and make the 
Supreme Court the ultimate arbiter of human rights matters in the UK’.15 
 
The aim of this paper is not to analyse whether criticisms of the HRA are justified. Nor is it to 
analyse whether such reforms are achievable given the UK’s ties to Europe and the ECHR’s 
integration into the UK’s internal constitutional arrangements through the devolution 
settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Rather, our purpose is to assess whether 
the debate over replacement of the Act might be usefully informed by the development of 
analogous instruments in Australia. 
 
Two sub-national jurisdictions in Australia have enacted adaptions of the HRA. The first was 
the Australian Capital Territory’s Human Rights Act 2004 (‘ACT Human Rights Act’); the 
second was Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (‘Victorian 
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 See Dominic Grieve, ‘Can a Bill of Rights do better than the Human Rights Act?’ [2016] PL (forthcoming); 
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 https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto. 
15
 Ibid. 
Charter’). These laws are significant because they were drafted in a way that responds to the 
concerns surrounding the HRA. As a result, they contain a number of novel design features, 
including an enhanced role for parliament, a revised interpretive function for the courts and 
domestic adaptions of particular human rights. 
 
In the next section we explain the background to these Australian instruments, and the 
adaptions made to the HRA. In doing so, our focus is upon the Victorian Charter. As the 
second of these enactments, it was in some respects a more refined model. To a greater 
extent, it was also drafted in light of the UK experience.
16
 In the following section, we assess 
the lessons that might be drawn from these adaptions, and whether they can serve as a model 
to address long-standing concerns about the HRA during the design of a new BBOR to 
replace it. 
 
Australian adaptions of the HRA 
Australia has gone through a number of debates about whether to bring about a bill of rights 
or human rights act.
17
 Legislation for such reform was introduced into the Australian 
Parliament in the 1970s and early 1980s, on both occasions failing to be passed. A national 
referendum was then put unsuccessfully in 1988 to introduce new provisions into the 
Australian Constitution protective of human rights. Similar debates have also occurred in 
Australia’s states and territories. 
 
The first, and to date only, occasions on which an Australian jurisdiction has enacted a 
comprehensive human rights law came with the enactment of the ACT Human Rights Act 
and the Victorian Charter. The timing of these enactments, in coming soon after the passage 
of the HRA, was not a coincidence. The UK law had a very significant impact upon the 
Australian debate. If nothing else, it removed a central argument against any such Act in 
Australia: that if the UK saw no need for such a law, then neither should Australia. The HRA 
was also deeply influential because Australia’s system of government owes much to the UK. 
The common law was received into Australia upon British settlement in 1788, and Australia’s 
parliamentary institutions are modelled upon the Westminster system. As a result, arguments 
around such instruments, such as in regard to the role of the judiciary and parliamentary 
sovereignty, were naturally influenced by the way in which such questions were resolved in 
the UK in favour of the HRA. 
 
The HRA was also influential – in a way that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was 
not – in shifting the Australian debate away from the notion that improved human rights 
protection should proceed by way of an amendment to the Australian Constitution. This 
might have produced a Bill of Rights in the American style, including a capacity for courts to 
declare legislation invalid. By contrast, the British model provided an influential 
counterpoint, demonstrating how human rights protection could be integrated into a 
Westminster system in a way that did not provide the judiciary with a final say over 
contentious laws and government policies. 
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 The chair of the consultative process (the second author to this article) that led to the enactment of the 
Victorian Charter spent a significant period of time in the UK while the Charter was being drafted: Rights, 
Responsibilities and Respect: The Report of the Human Rights Consultation Committee (Department of Justice, 
2005), 147. 
17
 See George Williams, A Charter of Rights for Australia (UNSW Press, 2007), 51-72. 
These factors explain why, soon after the enactment of the HRA, Australian jurisdictions 
moved to enact their own, like instruments. This though only tells part of the story. The HRA 
was certainly a catalyst for the Australian reforms, but not only in response to the perceived 
strengths of that instrument. Also significant was the view that developed in Australia that the 
HRA suffered from weaknesses of design. 
 
When Australia re-engaged with questions of human rights protection early in the last decade, 
the HRA had been in operation for some years. By then, a number of problems had arisen. 
Political support for the instrument in the Blair Labour government was waning, particularly 
when the courts began to impugn the government’s anti-terror legislation in high-profile 
judgments like Belmarsh
18
 in the years following 9/11. Popular support for the instrument 
also appeared to ebb, and the view emerged that the HRA gave insufficient regard to the 
sovereignty of the UK Parliament. The task then for Australian policymakers influenced by 
such concerns, but seeking to bring about an instrument in a like form, was to develop an 
adaption to the HRA that would ameliorate these problems. 
 
One early reaction to the HRA was that any Australian law should be brought about by a 
different process. The UK instrument was enacted through a means that focused almost 
exclusively upon Parliament, and so tended only to engage parliamentarians and experts. The 
HRA was a core feature of Labour’s manifesto pledge at the 1997 general election, and a 
central plank of its broader constitutional reform agenda that grew to encompass also 
devolution, freedom of information, House of Lords reform and creation of the UK Supreme 
Court. The promise of a domestic human rights instrument was a response to the erosion of 
civil liberties during the prior 18 years of Conservative rule. After Labour’s landslide victory, 
a bill of rights in some form or another was therefore a fait accompli, the only remaining 
questions being the more technical, esoteric ones of how to draft the legislation in a way that 
complied with the ECHR while preserving parliamentary sovereignty as the UK’s 
foundational constitutional principle. By that point in the process, the general public no 
longer had a role to play in the HRA’s creation. No attempt was made to educate society 
about the new instrument, for example in civic lessons in schools. 
 
This process of enacting the HRA was explicable in light of the political and legal 
circumstances of the time, but failed to account for the special nature of comprehensive 
human rights statutes designed to resolve contentious and highly-politicised questions of law 
and policy. Such laws are vulnerable to misrepresentation and political attack. The process by 
which they are enacted may well be important in producing a level of political support and 
popular ownership capable of buttressing the law and enhancing its legitimacy during times 
of adverse political reaction and controversy. 
 
The Australian jurisdictions followed a different path. In particular, it was decided that no bill 
of rights should be introduced into Parliament until the reform had been widely canvassed by 
way of a broad-ranging community consultation. Governments in the Australian Capital 
Territory,
19
 Victoria,
20
 Tasmania
21
 and Western Australia
22
 adopted this approach. Each 
                                                     
18
 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. See also A v UK (2009) 49 
EHRR 29. 
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 Towards an ACT Human Rights Act: Report of the ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee (Department of 
Justice and Community Safety, 2003). 
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 Rights, Responsibilities and Respect (fn 16). 
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 Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, A Charter of Rights for Tasmania (Report No 10, October 2007). 
consultation involved high levels of public engagement, and produced strong community 
support in favour of legislative reform. Of these, the processes in the first two jurisdictions 
led to legislation, with the Western Australian and Tasmanian governments losing office 
before following suit. 
 
In the case of Victoria, its Charter was preceded by a public consultation process conducted 
over the second half of 2005 by the Victorian Human Rights Consultation Committee, an 
independent panel appointed by the State Labor government. The Committee took part in 55 
community forums and had 75 other meetings with government and community bodies. It 
received 2524 written submissions, of which 84 per cent (or 94 per cent if petitions and group 
submissions are included) were in favour of reform.
23
 The Committee reported that the 
community was overwhelmingly wanted change, and recommended that the Victorian 
Parliament enact a new human rights law adapted from the UK HRA. The Victorian 
Parliament did so in 2006. 
 
These state and territory consultations culminated in a national debate. In 2008, the Rudd 
Labor government established an independent National Human Rights Consultation. It 
established a national record for the number of people engaged in such a process. It received 
35,014 written submissions, and held 66 community roundtables in 52 locations around 
Australia that were attended by more than 6000 people. Of the submissions, 87 per cent were 
in favour of a national human rights act.
24
 The Committee made 31 recommendations, 
including that ‘Australia adopt a federal Human Rights Act’ based on the model in force in 
the ACT and Victoria.
25
 In the midst of leadership turmoil, the Rudd government rejected 
most of these recommendations. In particular, it decided not to support a human rights act, 
saying that this would be ‘divisive’.26 Instead, it announced that it would implement a new 
‘Human Rights Framework’, the centrepiece of which is the Human Rights (Parliamentary 
Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth). This Act provides for enhanced processes of parliamentary scrutiny 
on human rights grounds, without providing additional powers to the courts.
27
 
 
The effect of such processes was to imbue the resulting legislative reforms in the ACT and 
Victoria with a sense of legitimacy and community ownership. This has undoubtedly been 
important, especially in Victoria. In 2006, the (conservative) Liberal Party opposition voted 
against the bill for the Victorian Charter. In 2010 they won office, with their Attorney 
General Robert Clark a vocal critic of the Charter, and proposing its repeal.
28
 The plan for 
repeal faltered when it received little community or media support. It instead provoked a 
counter-reaction
29
 from civil society organisations that marshalled evidence demonstrating 
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 Consultation Committee on a Human Rights Act for Western Australia, A WA Human Rights Act: Report of 
the Consultation Committee for a Proposed WA Human Rights Act (Department of the Attorney-General, 2007). 
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 Rights, Responsibilities and Respect (fn 16), v. 
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 National Human Rights Consultation Report (2009), 264. 
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 Robert McClelland, ‘Address to the National Press Club of Australia – Launch of Australia’s Human Rights 
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 See George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Exclusive Model of Parliamentary Rights Protection’ 
(2013) 34 Statute Law Review 58. 
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 See, for example, Robert Clark, ‘Human Rights Charter Wide Open to Abuse’ (Media Release, 18 January 
2009). 
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 For example, a coalition of over 70 human rights NGOs, community organisations, corporations and religious 
groups called instead for the Charter to be strengthened: Human Rights Law Centre, ‘Victorian Attorney-
General Should Commit to Strengthen Charter and Protection of Human Rights’ <http://hrlc.org.au/attorney-
general-should-strengthen-charter-and-protection-of-human-rights/>. 
how the Charter had operated at a low cost, and had on numerous instances improved the 
quality of people’s lives.30 After an inconclusive parliamentary inquiry31 that failed to build 
momentum for repeal, the government shelved its plans and accepted that the Charter would 
remain in force.
32
 Since that time, no further proposal has been made to repeal or otherwise 
weaken the Charter. 
 
Community consultation also had an impact upon how the Victorian Charter was drafted. 
This reflected the fact that the aim of the consultation was not merely to determine whether 
sufficient support existed to enact such a law, but to ensure that any resulting law reflected 
the community’s aspirations for human rights protection. This extended to incorporating 
language within the instrument reflective of community values, as shown for example in the 
use of ‘responsibilities’ in the title. 33  More generally, the Charter was framed not as a 
lawyers’ instrument, but as something that ‘could be used in schools and for broader 
community education, such as for new migrants to Victoria’.34. 
 
The contrast in this respect between the Victorian Charter and the HRA is stark. The latter 
opens with an introductory text that reads: 
 
An Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European 
Convention on Human Rights; to make provision with respect to holders of certain 
judicial offices who become judges of the European Court of Human Rights; and for 
connected purposes. 
 
On the other hand, the Victorian Charter (like the ACT Human Rights Act before it) begins 
with a preamble written in a form that might be posted upon the wall of a schoolroom: 
 
On behalf of the people of Victoria the Parliament enacts this Charter, recognising 
that all people are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
 
This Charter is founded on the following principles— 
 human rights are essential in a democratic and inclusive society that respects the 
rule of law, human dignity, equality and freedom; 
 human rights belong to all people without discrimination, and the diversity of the 
people of Victoria enhances our community; 
 human rights come with responsibilities and must be exercised in a way that 
respects the human rights of others; 
 human rights have a special importance for the Aboriginal people of Victoria, as 
descendants of Australia's first people, with their diverse spiritual, social, cultural 
and economic relationship with their traditional lands and waters. 
 
                                                     
30
 See the 101 case studies collated in Human Rights Law Centre, Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities in Action: Case Studies from the First Five Years of Operation (March 2012). 
31
 Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, Review of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 
2006 (2011). 
32
 For the response of the Victorian government to the parliamentary inquiry, see: 
<http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/file_uploads/VPARL2010-14No69GovtResponse_s9VCRV24.pdf>. 
33
 Rights, Responsibilities and Respect (fn 16), 30. 
34
 Ibid., ii. 
The Charter therefore uses terminology reminiscent of the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man, or US Constitution, designed to instil a sense of civic pride in the instrument. 
Throughout the text of the Charter that follows, though it must be said not always 
successfully,
35
 human rights and legal directives are spelt out as far as possible in ‘clear 
language’.36 For example, in introducing the protected rights, the Charter begins in s 7 with a 
provision headed ‘Human rights—what they are and when they may be limited’. That section 
provides that: ‘A human right may be subject under law only to such reasonable limits as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, and taking into account all relevant factors’, including ‘the nature of the right’ 
and ‘the importance of the purpose of the limitation’. In doing this, the legislation specifies 
the test of justification to be applied in determining whether a right has been breached, rather 
than leaving this wholly to judicial development. 
 
In keeping with the notion of popular ownership, the rights protected by the Australian 
instruments are not expressed to be derivative upon international sources, but are set down 
directly in the legislation. Hence, each instrument has been grounded purposefully in the 
notion that they express Australian conceptions of human rights. As a result, none of the 
rights are dependent upon conventions or other international documents (and so are not 
referred to as article 6, 7 or 8 etc. rights, as is the case with the HRA). 
 
The rights listed in the ACT law and the Victorian Charter are adapted from the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
37
 (ICCPR), to which Australia has been a party since 
1980. Australia is obligated under international law to observe these rights, and is also subject 
to a complaints procedure. In 1991, Australia acceded to the First Optional Protocol to the 
Covenant, which provides under Art 2 that ‘individuals who claim that any of their rights 
enumerated in the Covenant have been violated and who have exhausted all available 
domestic remedies’ may submit a written complaint to the Human Rights Committee of the 
United Nations. If, after considering the response of the national government concerned, the 
Human Rights Committee is satisfied that the complaint is made out, Art 5(4) provides that 
‘[t]he Committee shall forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual’. 
It is then left to the national government to indicate whether or how it will respond to those 
views. Most often, Australian governments have not acted in response to a finding that the 
ICCPR has been breached, preferring instead to maintain existing laws and policies.
38
 
 
Rights from the ICCPR have not simply been copied into the ACT and Victorian laws. 
Instead, the rights have on occasion been modified so that they are are set out in a form that is 
more in keeping with Australian legal and community norms, or have been updated for new 
developments or technologies since the drafting of the covenant in 1966. For example, among 
the twenty rights set out in the Victorian charter, the rights of the accused in criminal 
proceedings conferred by s 25 incorporates references to the provision of legal aid in Victoria 
and states that an accused shall ‘have the free assistance of assistants and specialised 
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 An exception is the convoluted language of s 39, which deals with legal proceedings. It reflects the preference 
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human rights breaches’: Department of Justice, Victoria, Human Rights in Victoria: Statement of Intent (2005). 
See Jeremy Gans, ‘The Charter’s Irremediable Remedies Provision’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law 
Review 105. 
36
 Rights, Responsibilities and Respect (fn 16) ii. 
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communication tools and technology if he or she has communication or speech difficulties 
that require such assistance’. The Victorian Charter also includes in s 20 a person’s right ‘not 
be deprived of his or her property other than in accordance with law’, even though there is no 
reference to such a right in the ICCPR. Both the ACT and Victorian instruments also modify 
the right to life so as to maintain the status quo as regards the law on abortion.
39
 This 
reflected the fact that the community consultations that led to these instruments did not 
produce a consensual view on the subject. 
 
In adopting this approach, the ACT and Victoria accepted the premise that underlay the 
enactment of the HRA (that is, of ‘bringing rights home’40), but sought to achieve this by 
giving greater emphasis to notions of domestic political authority. In this context, 
international law and comparative sources are certainly relevant to interpreting the protected 
rights, but they are not directive or determinative. Hence, in contrast to the more directive 
approach of s 2(1) HRA (‘must take into account’), s 32(2) of the Victorian Charter states: 
 
International law and the judgments of domestic, foreign and international courts and 
tribunals relevant to a human right may be considered in interpreting a statutory 
provision. 
 
Another important distinction between the Australian instruments and the HRA relates to the 
role of Parliament. While the UK law reads as an instrument directed almost exclusively to 
the courts, the ACT and Victorian statutes are drafted to give explicit regard to, and to 
emphasise, the centrality of Parliament in the rights-protection process. The object here is not 
to limit the role of courts in rights protection, but to enhance the role of Parliament. The 
problem to be solved is thus not one of so-called ‘judicial activism’, but of insufficient 
attention being paid to the contribution that Parliament can properly make to rights 
protection. 
 
The Australian instruments place greater emphasis upon the role of Parliament in a number of 
ways. First, in regard to statements of compatibility, the Victorian Charter goes further than 
the HRA in requiring the person introducing a bill to provide a justification as to why it is 
compatible with the protected human rights or, if it is incompatible, an explanation of the 
nature and extent of incompatibility.
41
 These reasons are important in establishing a clear 
parliamentary position not only on compatibility, but on the appropriate interpretation of 
human rights in the context of the legislation. It is important that Parliament be a place for 
setting such matters out upfront if there is to be greater judicial deference to its position. 
 
Second, the interpretive function of the courts is limited by a requirement that any reading 
given to a statute must pay heed to the legislative intent underlying the enactment. Hence, the 
interpretive function conferred upon the courts by the HRA is modified in Victoria by the 
addition of the following words in italics in s 32(1): 
 
So far as it is possible to do so consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions 
must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights. 
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 Section 48 of the Charter states: ‘Nothing in this Charter affects any law applicable to abortion or child 
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 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (Secretary of State for the Home Department, October 1997). 
41
 Victorian Charter, s 28. 
This interpretive obligation was altered to indicate that Australian courts should not go so far 
as to follow the approach taken in the UK in cases such as Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza.
42
 On 
the other hand, it was intended that this provision enable courts to go beyond existing 
Australian interpretive methods so as to ensure greater consistency between Victorian statutes 
and human rights standards. 
 
To date, this modified clause has not produced a clear approach to the interpretation of 
legislation. This is a result of confusion produced by the High Court’s decision in Momcilovic 
v The Queen.
43
 The Court suggested two potential approaches to s 32(1): one which treated 
the interpretation clause as akin to the common law principle of legality, and another which 
treated it as encouraging a more flexible approach to interpretation.
44
 Rather than resolving 
this, the Court split without producing a majority. In the absence of a further High Court 
decision, uncertainly remains about the approach to be applied. 
 
Third, when a court finds that a law cannot be interpreted consistently with human rights, it is 
empowered to issue a declaration of inconsistent interpretation, rather than what the HRA 
describes as a declaration of incompatibility. The use of the word ‘interpretation’ emphasises 
that the court has reached a different interpretation than Parliament, rather than it delivering a 
definitive finding that human rights have been breached. While the essential function of the 
declaration mechanism is retained, the use of different language is significant in describing 
the respective roles of Parliament and the courts in a way that gives greater regard to the role 
of the former. 
 
Fourth, in the case of the Victorian Charter, though not in respect of the ACT law, Parliament 
is empowered by s 31 to make an override declaration, by which it may determine that a law 
‘has effect despite being incompatible with one or more of the human rights or despite 
anything else set out in this Charter’. The person introducing a bill containing such a 
declaration must make a statement to Parliament ‘explaining the exceptional circumstances 
that justify the inclusion of the override declaration’. The provision to which the declaration 
relates expires after five years, though Parliament may re-enact the override. 
 
This override mechanism serves no apparent legal purpose given Parliament’s power to 
amend or suspend the Charter. Nonetheless, it has an important political function.
45
 It 
emphasises the ongoing sovereignty of Parliament, and provides a means for this to be 
exercised within the terms of the Charter. This provides an escape valve for political pressure 
in the event of a fundamental disagreement between Parliament and the courts as to the 
interpretation and application of human rights. The override presents a pragmatic approach to 
such disagreements designed to preserve the integrity of the instrument (such as in the event 
that a controversy arose like that in the UK over prisoners voting). In such a case, the Charter 
makes it clear that Parliament may act to resolve the matter, at least in the short-term. 
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 [2004] 2 AC 557 (HL). 
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 It may be that in the case of the Victorian Charter this function has been exhausted. The most recent review of 
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Another pragmatic recognition within the Australian instruments relates to the role of the 
executive. Both laws were drafted with the goal in mind of improving the human rights of 
vulnerable people through the most effective means possible. It was accepted that the courts 
would not normally provide such a means, even if they were necessary and important in 
particular cases. Instead, the most effective protector in a day to day sense would usually be 
the executive through its provision of services (in areas such as aged care, health and 
education). It was also recognised that the HRA had not been as effective as it might have 
been in instilling a culture of human rights protection within government departments and 
service providers. For example, a 2003 report by the UK Audit Commission found that ‘a 
human rights culture takes time to develop. Our current findings show that progress is slow 
and in danger of stalling.’46  
 
To facilitate a different outcome, the enactment of the Charter in Victoria was preceded by 
extensive engagement with the executive so as to build ownership and respect for the 
instrument among public servants.
47
 Charter consultations were held with every department, 
and the drafting of the Charter was supported by an interdepartmental committee 
representative of the entire public service. This led to a number of innovations, including 
changing practices within departments to apply the Charter, and new cabinet processes to 
ensure that Charter rights were considered at the highest levels of executive decision-
making.
48
 Upon its enactment, the Victorian Charter was accompanied by training and other 
measures for government employees.  
 
The Charter has also been integrated into a range of performance and other measures within 
departments. For example, the Victorian Department of Human Services access and diversity 
framework states that including reference to the Charter ‘in staff Performance, Progression 
and Development Plans (PPD)’ has ‘played an important role in raising awareness of staff’s 
human rights obligations’.49 This and other initiatives, including designating people within 
departments as ‘Charter champions’, has produced change in many areas of policy and 
practice, such as by improving the provision of disability services and conditions for the 
detention of people with a mental illness.
50
 
 
Finally, each Australian instrument was enacted with a view to it being the first, and not the 
final, step in the path to an appropriate model of rights protection. This is demonstrated most 
clearly by the fact that the ACT and Victorian laws are subject to a regular cycle of review.
51
 
This provides a regular opportunity for assessing whether the instruments are meeting their 
goals, and for enabling the community and Parliament to play ongoing role in designing the 
mechanism of rights protection. As a consequence, these instruments are not left to the courts 
alone through their ongoing role of interpretation and application. In the case of the ACT, for 
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example, reviews have led to a number of significant changes, including to extend its Human 
Rights Act to public authorities and to provide protection for an economic, social and cultural 
right in the form of the right to education.
52
 
 
In the case of Victoria, reviews are mandated by the Charter to occur four and eight years 
after its enactment. These are supplemented by an annual independent assessment of the 
operation of the Charter, and the steps taken by government and other public authorities to 
meet their responsibilities under it, by the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights 
Commission. This annual report is presented to the Attorney General and tabled in 
Parliament, and is designed to present an ongoing record of the operation of the Charter that 
will assist with the four yearly reviews. 
 
The second of these reviews, conducted by an independent reviewer outside of the 
government, was delivered in 2015. The report notes that the Charter ‘was introduced as a 
commitment between the Parliament and the people of Victoria … designed to improve the 
lives of individuals and the life of the community as a whole’.53 In this spirit, the review team 
‘travelled in excess of 3,000 kilometres across Victoria in the effort to meet with as many 
interested parties face to face’ and received written submissions from 109 individuals and 
organisations. The reviewer concluded that ‘it is clear to me that the Charter has helped to 
promote and protect human rights in Victoria. However, there is more work to be done in 
making the Charter as practical as it could be, in demystifying it and bringing it with the 
reach of all Victorians.’ The 267 page report made 52 recommendations for enhancing the 
instrument. Many of these were directed to further developing a culture of human rights 
protection within government, the private sector and the community. Other recommendations 
propose that sections of the Charter be rewritten for greater clarity and effect, such as the 
interpretive clause in s 32(1).
54
 It was also recommended that a further review be held four 
years after the commencement of proposed complaints and remedies provisions.
55
 
 
Lessons for the HRA debate? 
The ACT Human Rights Act and Victorian Charter offer a range of alternate design 
possibilities for the UK debate regarding the nature of the BBOR. It is clear that a number of 
these are not directly transplantable into the UK context. In particular, it is doubtful that 
much would be gained by redrafting the interpretative obligation in the HRA along the lines 
of s 32(1) of the Victorian Charter, so that statutes must be interpreted compatibly with 
human rights ‘consistently with their purpose’.56 For one, the Conservatives have signalled 
their intention to dispense with the interpretative obligation in the BBOR altogether: ‘In 
future, the UK courts will interpret legislation based upon its normal meaning and the clear 
intention of Parliament’.57 The Victorian formulation, as applied by the High Court, has also 
caused confusion, even though the additional words were inserted with the aim of improving 
on the HRA position by preventing the Victorian courts from interpreting statutes as boldly as 
their UK counterparts in cases like Ghaidan.
58
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In any event, it is difficult to see what the words ‘consistently with their purpose’ would add 
beyond merely making explicit what the UK courts have already inferred from the existing 
formulation under s 3 HRA, notably in Ghaidan itself: that ECHR-compatible interpretations 
will not be ‘possible’ unless they ‘go with the grain of’59  and are ‘compatible with the 
underlying thrust of the legislation being construed’.60 It is also unclear that the scope of the 
interpretative obligation could be rendered any more precise by amending its wording. 
Although the interpretative obligation is a powerful tool, it nevertheless remains an 
interpretative one, and necessarily leaves the underlying distinction between the respective 
roles of courts and Parliament untouched. 
 
As Lord Nicholls has observed, the courts must remain ‘ever mindful’ of the outer-limits to 
their powers: s 3 HRA ‘maintains the constitutional boundary. Interpretation of statutes is a 
matter for the courts; the enactment of statutes, and the amendment of statutes, are matters for 
Parliament’.61 The difficulty is that these outer-limits have never been especially clear. They 
are rooted in deep-seated constitutional norms such as parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of 
law, democracy and the separation of powers,
62
 none of which are sufficiently hard-edged to 
provide the courts with concrete guidance as to how to act. Whether under the HRA, 
Victorian Charter or a BBOR, the inherent uncertainty in the very task of interpretation will 
muddy the waters whatever the finer wording of the interpretative obligation itself. 
 
It is also doubtful that any reformulation of the HRA, or the enactment of the BBOR, could 
be preceded by an extensive consultation processes as in Australia. Any such notion is 
something of a pipe dream in the present political climate. Instead, the government has 
already announced a different process, including an intention on the part of the Justice 
Secretary to ‘fast track’ the Bill into domestic law. Precisely how this will manifest itself 
remains to be seen, but it seems that a proposal will be released for public consultation for a 
short twelve-week period before the government bypasses both Green and White Paper stages 
and introduces the Bill directly into the House of Commons.
63
 
 
Like the HRA, the BBOR is the direct product of a manifesto pledge to reform the UK’s law 
on human rights, and at present it would seem doubtful that the public will be any more 
significantly involved in the design and enactment of the new legislation than it was in the 
enactment of the HRA. This represents a missed opportunity given the Australian experience, 
which demonstrates the benefits of building domestic human rights law on a platform of 
widespread public support, rather than on the relatively unstable foundations of party politics. 
Such a platform is important in terms of ensuring that the instrument enjoys cross-party 
support, which can be a vital ingredient in ensuring the effectiveness of a constitutional 
statute of this kind. The government’s process also represents a failure to address one of the 
more significant problems identified by the Coalition-appointed Commission on a Bill of 
Rights: that ‘there is a lack of public understanding and “ownership” of the Human Rights 
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Act’ within the UK. For the majority of Commission members, this was ‘the most powerful 
argument for a new constitutional instrument’ to replace it.64 
 
Other aspects of the Australian experience may be of greater use in the drafting of a BBOR. 
We analyse these possibilities below. 
 
Preamble and Responsibilities 
There are good reasons why a new BBOR might be given a preamble like that contained in 
the Australian instruments. Whatever the BBOR’s eventual form, it is clear that the aim is to 
reform the domestic system of ECHR protection in a way that adds a distinctively ‘British’ 
twist that transcends the simple preservation of parliamentary sovereignty by the HRA. The 
BBOR will be the product of a number of years’ political discourse; of compromise between 
Left and Right, between Conservative-dominated England and the differently politically-
constituted devolved nations, and between the demands of domestic and international law. Its 
purpose in protecting human rights in domestic courts will not just be ‘to give further effect 
to the rights and freedoms’ under the ECHR, as the HRA’s preamble states, but to bring these 
‘British’ values to the fore in a way that a new preamble needs to capture. 
 
In this regard the Australian adaptions are useful models for emphasising that the impetus for 
protecting rights in municipal courts comes from domestic political and legal traditions – 
democracy, dignity, equality, freedom, the rule of law and the like – and not from an 
international instrument alone, as the HRA’s barer preamble suggests. Respect for basic 
rights is not an exclusively European ideal, after all: domestic common law has long evinced 
a basic concern to safeguard civil liberties, and it has been stressed that ‘the UK had a great 
influence on the drafting of the Convention, and was the first nation to ratify it’.65 Greater 
reference to the British values that are said to demand domestic rights protection is therefore 
necessary if the government’s purpose in designing a BBOR to replace the HRA is to be 
correctly captured. Along these lines we would recommend referencing the same core values 
– the rule of law, dignity, democracy, and so on – referenced by the Victorian Charter. These 
concepts should be expressed in straightforward terms in order to make them, and the 
preamble, accessible to as wide an audience as possible. 
 
We would also recommend that the preamble follows the Charter’s lead in making reference 
to the notion that human rights are bounded by responsibilities. The public perception of the 
HRA as a simple charter for the self-advancement of criminals and terrorists is misguided but 
nevertheless dangerously prevalent, particularly in the tabloid media.
66
 Long-term public 
acceptance of the BBOR depends heavily on this myth being dispelled. There are a number of 
ways to do this, but an obvious starting point would be to make the true legal position clear: 
that in domestic law human rights – even unqualified rights – have never been unbounded, 
being inherently open to legislative limitations. For the avoidance of doubt, the authors are 
not recommending any of the substantive proposals for rebalancing rights and responsibilities 
that have previously been mooted elsewhere. We do not for instance recommend that the 
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rights themselves be re-drafted as conditional upon the beneficiary being law-abiding, or a 
British citizen.
67
 
 
Our argument is simpler and far less controversial: that the preamble to the BBOR should 
acknowledge the reality, that in a system with a sovereign Parliament there is no such thing 
as a truly unqualified right, and that as a matter of domestic law the exercise of human rights 
will always be subject to whatever constraints – including responsibilities to others – 
Parliament decides to impose. This is of course foursquare with domestic common-law 
tradition, which recognises basic rights but enforces them as interpretative presumptions of 
non-interference that can be defeated by the use of clear statutory language by a sovereign 
legislature.
68
 It is further reflected in the HRA, by provisions that recognise Parliament’s 
continuing sovereignty;
69
 and to a large extent is also reflected on the international plane by 
the ECHR itself, through the notion that in many circumstances a fair balance must be struck, 
such that the rights may yield to other, weightier, considerations: Arts 8-11 are generally 
qualified and therefore permit proportionate interference by the state for a variety of aims 
including the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and Art 15 allows the state to 
derogate from the majority of substantive ECHR rights during times of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation. In our view the BBOR would benefit from 
setting out the true position: that individuals do already owe myriad legal responsibilities to 
each other in domestic law; and that their responsibilities can trump even unqualified human 
rights if Parliament so chooses, and makes its intentions clear. Of course, this is not to say 
that redrafting the preamble would generate any substantive change to the courts’ interpretive 
approach to legislation. The point is simply that it would yield important politically symbolic 
benefits, through adopting a form of words that connects the legislation to enduring legal and 
community values. 
 
 
Substantive Rights 
In the previous section we observed that the Victorian Charter contains ‘domestic’ variations 
of international rights, in that certain of the rights given by the ICCPR are redrafted to take 
account of Australian needs and traditions. Their domestic status is further emphasised by 
including them in individual sections of the legislation: the Victorian Charter departs from 
the HRA’s practice of reproducing the international rights verbatim in a schedule. In these 
respects there are lessons to be learned from Australia, not least that international rights can 
be domesticated for the purpose of enhancing as well as reducing protection. In this regard, 
the Justice Secretary has suggested that the BBOR might add to the ECHR’s catalogue of 
rights by including ‘British’ rights such as trial by jury.70 
 
Redrawing rights ‘downwards’ remains a possibility, however. The Conservatives see 
nothing wrong with the ECHR itself, which in their view represents ‘an entirely sensible 
statement of the principles which should underpin any modern democratic nation’.71 The 
complaint is rather with Strasbourg’s interpretation of it, in particular the ‘mission creep’ said 
to be present in cases like Chahal v UK,
72
 which held that it represents a breach of Art 3 
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ECHR for the state to expel foreign nationals if there are substantial grounds for believing 
that they face a real risk of Art 3-incompatible treatment in the receiving country. The 
Conservatives intend the BBOR to ‘clarify what the test should be [for the application of Art 
3 in expulsion cases], in line with our commitment to prevent torture and in keeping with the 
approach taken by other developed nations.’73 
 
Naturally, it falls within the power of a sovereign Parliament to follow Australia’s lead by 
redrawing ECHR rights to take account of domestic considerations. Nevertheless, we would 
sound two notes of caution. First, it is crucial not to overreact to what may be seen as 
expansive Strasbourg decisions. Disagreements over the scope of an unqualified right should 
not simply be resolved by excising the relevant decision from domestic law. Taking the 
Chahal example, it would be overkill simply to exclude expulsion from Art 3. On this 
reading, Art 3 would leave the government free to expel foreign nationals at will, whatever 
the risk that they would face torture or inhuman and degrading treatment abroad. The better 
alternative would be to qualify such cases using a limited doctrine of proportionality, so that 
expulsion remains within the scope of Art 3 but is permitted if the government satisfies the 
courts of the strict necessity to expel for a narrow list of defined aims: national security and 
the prevention of crime, for example.
74
 In all other circumstances Art 3 would remain 
unqualified in domestic law and its scope materially identical to that in Strasbourg. 
 
As for the second note of caution, the government must remain mindful of its international 
obligations, both in Strasbourg and generally.
75
 It would be inappropriate for the UK to 
follow the Victorian Charter’s lead of importing a general proportionality-style qualification 
into all of the rights.
76
 On the international plane, the ICCPR lacks the binding political force 
of the ECHR, which operates as a very significant constraint on the UK’s activities. However 
much the government may wish to recast the ECHR rights for domestic purposes, 
Strasbourg’s interpretation of the ECHR will continue to prevail in international law for as 
long as the UK remains a signatory to the treaty. In other words the practical need to ‘bring 
rights home’, by providing domestic remedies for ECHR violations actionable in Strasbourg, 
will remain under the current plans. Once again, moderation is crucial here: any deviations 
from Strasbourg’s interpretation of the ECHR in the new BBOR should be kept to a 
minimum, and preferably within the margin of appreciation given to the UK by Strasbourg 
itself. For this reason we would also caution against any radical redrafting of s 2 HRA, which 
provides that the courts ‘must take into account’ Strasbourg jurisprudence when interpreting 
ECHR rights. The strong gravitational pull towards Strasbourg’s interpretation of the ECHR 
does not derive from s 2 HRA alone, and the legal and practical realities of European 
integration are such that the existing wording remains broadly appropriate. To the extent that 
there is a perceived need to weaken the formal link between Strasbourg and domestic courts, 
however, we would recommend adopting the Victorian Charter’s formulation: 77  relevant 
Strasbourg judgments may be considered. 
 
Enhancing Parliament’s Role 
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In several respects the UK can learn from the Australian experience in enhancing 
Parliament’s role in protecting human rights. First, and as the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (JCHR) has recommended,
78
 the BBOR should contain a requirement that pre-
enactment statements of compatibility be accompanied by reasons. As it stands, the only 
obligation under s 19 of the HRA is to make a statement either way, and a requirement to 
give reasons in all cases would be an obvious means of enhancing Parliament’s power to hold 
the executive to account for its treatment of human rights. Section 19 statements of 
incompatibility have only been made a handful of times,
79
 yet the courts have found a great 
many more ECHR-incompatibilities in legislation that was passed with a positive statement – 
including the flagrantly discriminatory measures contained in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 that were later impugned both domestically and by Strasbourg in 
Belmarsh.
80
 Ministers arguably need to be encouraged to take their s 19 obligations more 
seriously, and requiring them to face frontline political fire by giving reasons would be a 
positive step in that direction. 
 
Second, the BBOR should follow Victoria by restyling the declaration of ‘incompatibility’ 
under s 4 HRA a declaration of ‘inconsistent interpretation’. As we observed above, there is a 
general benefit in doing so, because it emphasises Parliament’s role in the rights-protection 
process by removing the stigma of a definitive judicial finding by the courts that a given 
provision is ‘incompatible’ with rights. Instead, the declaration signifies that courts and 
Parliament have taken different views as to the requirements of a particular right in the 
circumstances. 
 
In our view the BBOR should incorporate a restyled declaration provision, especially given 
that the BBOR is likely to follow Victoria’s practice of ‘domesticating’ certain of the 
international rights given by the ECHR. There is a need for declarations of incompatibility 
under the HRA because the Act closely ties the judges to Strasbourg’s interpretation of the 
ECHR’s requirements. Within the HRA framework, there is also a pressing practical need for 
a definitive ruling on the compatibility of a piece of legislation with the ECHR, because the 
government needs to be formally notified of potential UK liability in Strasbourg. Under a 
BBOR, the position would be different because Strasbourg’s interpretation of the ECHR will 
lack the same importance, the aim being that it should yield more frequently to the competing 
domestic formulations of Parliament and the UK courts. This reflects the fact that the purpose 
of the BBOR would not simply be to give further effect to rights and freedoms recognised by 
the Strasbourg Court. 
 
Third, the BBOR would benefit from including an override declaration like that in s 31 of the 
Victorian Charter. One of the most curious features of the BBOR debate over the last ten 
years or so is the extent of the polarisation of opinion that seems apparent between lawyers 
and Conservative politicians. The Conservatives claim that the HRA unduly fetters 
Parliament’s sovereignty by tying domestic law to Strasbourg’s interpretation of the ECHR; 
lawyers respond that this misrepresents the legal position, especially the distinction between 
domestic and international law, and that nothing in the HRA prevents a sovereign Parliament 
from enacting whatever legislation it pleases. 
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The authors wonder whether lawyers and politicians might be talking across each other. 
Legally Parliament can override ECHR rights if it pleases in domestic law, and a number of 
provisions emphasise that Parliament remains sovereign.
81
 But the HRA contains nothing 
explicit to indicate that overriding ECHR rights may be politically permissible. Section 14 of 
the HRA references the power of the UK to derogate from ECHR rights under the ECHR 
itself, but Art 15 of the ECHR limits the power to derogate to certain rights: Arts 3, 4 and 7, 
for instance, are non-derogable. In our view a general override clause like that contained in s 
31 of the Victorian Charter would usefully supplement the pre-existing legal position – that 
Parliament remains sovereign – by explicitly recognising that sometimes, albeit in extreme 
circumstances, overriding ECHR rights may also be the politically expedient thing to do. As 
one commentator has put it, the override clause represents ‘a tool of constitutional politics; an 
indication that certain legislative decisions taken from time to time should… be placed 
outside the courts’ range of review.’82 
 
Significant questions of course arise. The first concerns the relationship between the override 
clause under the BBOR, and the ECHR. Since a sovereign Parliament’s legal power to 
override ECHR rights is unfettered, there would be no need to couch the override clause in 
terms of Art 15 of the ECHR. In fact it would merely serve to confuse if the clause were 
drafted in this way, because the implication would be that Parliament is legally unable to do 
anything that the UK government could not do in Strasbourg under Art 15. By implication, 
the courts might be empowered to strike offending statutes down, and parliamentary 
sovereignty would be curtailed. 
 
The override clause therefore needs to be couched in terms reflecting Parliament’s limitless 
power to enact ECHR-incompatible legislation, as the JCHR suggested when it recommended 
that the BBOR should emphasise Parliament’s existing power to declare that legislation shall 
operate notwithstanding fundamental rights.
83
 But the difficulty in including such an open-
ended override clause is the political message that it risks communicating: that in political 
terms, breaching ECHR rights is always fair game. Even if breaching ECHR rights may 
sometimes be required as a matter of political necessity, over-emphasising Parliament’s legal 
power to do so in the BBOR would be unwise. For that reason the override clause must be 
accompanied by procedural obligations that enhance Parliament’s ability to hold the 
executive to account when the override power is used. As under the Victorian Charter the 
emphasis should therefore be on the exceptional circumstances that justify an override, and 
the minister responsible for the Bill should be required to report these circumstances to 
Parliament. The provision to which the override relates should also expire after a fixed period 
unless the override is re-enacted: the five-year period specified by the Victorian Charter 
would seem sensibly transplantable into the UK context given that it mirrors the life of 
Parliament under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. 
 
The second question with an override clause is this: since Parliament’s sovereignty exists 
independently of the override clause, which can only recognise the legislature’s pre-existing 
legislative power, what is the legal consequence if Parliament chooses to override rights 
without resorting to the clause? Presumably the courts would need to apply the legislation 
regardless: unlike under the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, there would 
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be no room for saying that the courts could strike the legislation down. The conundrum is a 
difficult one to resolve, and we do not attempt to do so fully here. Parliament is not legally 
required to make use of the override clause when breaching human rights, but it is important 
from the perspective of political accountability that it does so, in order that the procedural 
obligations under the override clause are triggered. But the more exacting those procedural 
obligations become, the more inclined Parliament will surely be to bypass the override in 
favour of its general constitutional power as a sovereign legislature to enact whatever 
legislation it pleases. Ultimately the best resolution is therefore to call for balance: to ensure 
that the override clause contains enhanced procedural obligations beyond the standard 
methods of political accountability provided for elsewhere in the legislation, but to avoid 
those procedural obligations becoming so burdensome that they are never used. 
 
The final lesson from Australia for enhancing Parliament’s role is to provide for regular 
review of the BBOR by an independent panel,
84
 preferably the JCHR. The Bill seems likely 
to be ‘fast-tracked’ in the manner mentioned above, without the extensive Victorian-style 
public consultation process to precede it. It is therefore important that the legislation be seen 
for what it is: not as the final say on how to protect human rights in domestic law, but as 
phase two of a broader iterative process that seeks to arrive at a rights-protection framework 
that strikes an appropriate balance between European and British demands. Providing for 
five-year review in the next parliament would also seem sensible here, as would following 
the Victorian Charter’s lead by specifying the terms of that review. Given that one of the 
BBOR’s central aims is to weaken the ties between domestic courts and Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, each review should at least consider whether to strengthen those ties again in 
the light of any developments in Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. 
 
Conclusion 
The long-running debate over the future of the HRA reflects a number of underlying 
concerns, namely that the Act pays insufficient regard to parliamentary sovereignty, places 
undue weight upon Strasbourg’s interpretation of the ECHR and has led to inappropriate 
outcomes in specific cases. Our purpose has not been to assess the correctness of these 
claims, which have produced a policy on the part of the Conservative government to repeal 
the HRA and replace it with a BBOR. Instead, we have analysed whether any such move 
might be informed by Australia’s enactment of modified versions of the HRA. 
 
The ACT Human Rights Act and the Victorian Charter are apposite in a number of respects. 
The Victorian Charter in particular contains a number of design features that respond directly 
to the perceived problems with the HRA. Significantly, it responds in a way that seeks to 
enhance the protection afforded to human rights. It does so by providing a better base for 
education and community engagement about rights, and also a greater capacity for Parliament 
to play a role in the protection process. This has enabled the instrument to operate effectively, 
ultimately also with cross-party support. 
 
It is crucial that the UK also attains a model of human rights protection with broad political 
and community support. Years of debilitating debate have demonstrated the problems of 
having a statute of such constitutional significance as the HRA subject to frequent media 
attack and ongoing criticism from one side of politics. A BBOR offers an opportunity by 
which to move beyond this problem. It could be a means to achieve a more effective and 
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sustainable human rights law. In aiming for this goal, the Australian experience is useful. In 
particular, a BBOR might incorporate an accessible preamble setting out the values that 
underlie the need for human rights protection, mechanisms for an enhanced parliamentary 
role and a requirement for ongoing review. Such changes offer not only a way to resolve 
some of the key questions besetting the HRA, but also the potential for achieving a more 
enduring model of human rights protection for the UK. 
